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Message from the Chair:
Section Celebrates Its 25th 
Anniversary With a Look at Its 
History and a Focus on Its Future
The Membership 
of the ILS
 I am excited and honored 
to have been asked to lead 
the over 1,100 lawyers 
who make up the current 
membership of the Inter-
national Law Section and 
the thousands of other in-
ternational practitioners 
within the Florida Bar who are not yet 
members of the ILS. The ILS is unique 
among all the sections of the Florida Bar 
because its members practice in virtually 
every discipline known to the law. Within 
our membership are lawyers who practice 
international transactional law, litigation, 
international arbitration, travel law, tax and 
estate planning law, immigration law, crimi-
Promotion of the Concept 
of the Rule of Law Through 
Implementation of the Central 
America Free Trade Agreement 
By Phillip A. Buhler, Esq., Moseley, Prichard, Parrish, Knight & Jones
I. Prologue – The Rule of Law 
and the Liberal Tradition
 The concept of “The Rule of Law” is the 
foundation for stable, impartial and tenured 
systems of jurisprudence in developed and 
developing modern industrial democracies. 
It is a concept which allowed the advance of 
administrative and judicial systems from the 
absolute rule of individuals and elite groups 
to governments based upon the will of the 
broad population. Indeed, this principle has 
allowed the development of advanced legal 
systems which in turn have permitted the 
introduction of complex transnational com-
mercial relationships and the rapid integra-
tion of global commerce and society.
 William Pitt acknowledged that “where 
law ends tyranny begins.” Friedrich Hayek, 
decrying the decline of the rule of law in 
the mid-Twentieth Century, wrote that “the 
Rule of Law means that people do not have 
to answer to the arbitrary decisions of gov-
ernmental officials, instead they guide their 
actions by what is prohibited by a clearly 
See Rule of Law,” page 21
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defined law.” Very recently, a Chinese 
lawyer who has challenged the lack 
of a fair and impartial legal system 
in his own country, and has been 
persecuted for this challenge, wrote 
his summary of the principle: 
“The opposite of rule of law is rule 
of person. In contrast, a key aspect 
of rule of law is ‘limitation’. Rule of 
law puts limits on the discretionary 
power of government… The rule of 
law ensures that individuals have 
a secure area of autonomy and have 
settled expectations by having their 
rights and duties pre-established 
and enforced by law.” 
 Quoting the Eighteenth Century 
philosopher Charles de Secondat 
Montesquieu, “We are free because 
we live under civil laws.” 1
 In the summer of 2006 lawyers 
and businessmen in the Dominican 
Republic, the United States and most 
of Central America experienced full 
implementation of the Dominican Re-
public – Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (hereinafter CAFTA). 
This regional trade agreement, fol-
lowing on the general model of the 
North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) and the parameters 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), is intended to es-
tablish a comprehensive legal regime 
to reduce and eventually eliminate 
most national barriers to the trade 
of goods and services between the 
United States and the countries of 
Central America and the Dominican 
Republic. 
 There is a substantial history in 
much of Central America of efforts to 
create free and open markets and pro-
mulgate a stable legal regimen to en-
courage development through foreign 
commerce. The nations of Central 
America, initially established as the 
United Provinces of Central America, 
obtained independence from Spain 
scarcely a generation after the United 
States, and were governed in the 
formative years (the 1820s) by a clas-
sic liberal regime. The government 
sought to break with the statist and 
mercantilist Spanish imperial system 
by opening the region to foreign com-
merce and reducing or eliminating 
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the influence of the landed holdings 
of the Church and Iberian/Creole ar-
istocracy. The Liberal policies of this 
government included elimination of 
many barriers to foreign investment 
and trade, promotion of capitalist 
enterprises and settlement of foreign 
nationals (principally British and lat-
er German and North American).2 
 Unfortunately, these policies did 
not lead to uniformly positive results. 
The influx of foreign investment and 
commerce into the nascent United 
Provinces caused economic and social 
dislocations in certain areas and led 
to resentment of outside influence 
and a certain insularity that endures. 
The struggle between rival interests 
and their reaction to the opening of 
Central America to free trade also led 
to a series of civil wars and polariza-
tion between Liberal and Conserva-
tive parties that existed well into 
the Twentieth Century. The failure 
of Central America’s first liberal re-
gime was reflected most starkly in 
the break-up of the nascent Central 
American republic by 1840 into the 
respective states which exist today. 
Not only did this reaction create diffi-
culties for foreign trade and relations, 
but also established internal barriers 
within the former United Provinces 
which in part still exist.
II. The CAFTA –
A Summary and Overview3
 CAFTA is a broad free trade agree- continued, next page
ment governing tariff and regulatory 
matters for the trade of goods and 
services between the United States, 
on the one hand, and Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ni-
caragua and the Dominican Republic 
on the other. As set forth more fully 
in Section III below, CAFTA follows 
a succession of free trade agreements 
between the United States and other 
countries in Latin America and other 
parts of the world. 
 On October 1, 2002, President 
George Bush notified Congress of 
the Administration’s intention to en-
ter into negotiations for a free trade 
agreement with the five Central 
American countries. Those negotia-
tions took place between January and 
December 2003. Negotiations were 
completed with all of these countries 
except Costa Rica, which withdrew 
and later renewed negotiations which 
were ultimately completed in January 
2004. Separate negotiations between 
the United States and the Dominican 
Republic also began in January 2004 
and with the decision to incorporate 
the Dominican Republic into CAFTA, 
those negotiations were completed 
by March 15, 2004. CAFTA was ul-
timately signed by all seven party 
nations on August 4, 2004.4 
 Ratification of CAFTA by the sig-
natory countries has been a longer, 
and in some cases, much more dif-
ficult process. In the United States, 
Congratulations!
The International Law Section
celebrates 25 years of service
to the profession!
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they may agree. Due to both ratifica-
tion and implementation issues, the 
2005 date was not met. Respective 
official government websites indicate 
that CAFTA entered into force in El 
Salvador on March 1, 2006 and in 
Honduras and Nicaragua on April 
1, 2006. After several delays CAFTA 
went into force in Guatemala on July 
1, 2006 and in the Dominican Repub-
lic on March 1, 2007. The CAFTA 
provisions now apply in the United 
States as to the countries which have 
implemented the Treaty.10
 It should also be noted that CAFTA 
does not change the customs and 
trade relationships between the na-
tions party to the Treaty in Central 
America and the Dominican Repub-
lic. Trade between these countries is 
governed by existing bilateral agree-
ments which to a great extent have 
reduced or eliminated many of the 
prior trade barriers.11 One of the ar-
guments in the Costa Rican debate 
is that CAFTA will encourage the 
Central American countries to come 
together themselves. Some progress 
is being made between Honduras, 
Guatemala and El Salvador on this 
score, but on the other hand opposi-
tion to CAFTA in some quarters has 
stalled negotiations with the Europe-
an Union on a similar agreement.12
III. Precursors and 
Successors
 The reduction of tariffs and other 
trade barriers and the effort to open 
up free trade in Central America 
substantially predates the begin-
ning of the CAFTA negotiations. In 
fact, the opponents of CAFTA usu-
ally fail to acknowledge that all of 
the signatories to the Convention 
have enjoyed substantially the same 
privileges vis à vis their trade with 
the United States for over twenty 
years. In many respects, CAFTA only 
serves to equalize these trade advan-
tages by reducing or eliminating most 
of the barriers to U.S. products and 
businesses entering Central America 
and the Dominican Republic as those 
countries’ products and businesses 
have enjoyed moving in the other 
direction.
 In the early 1980s, the United 
States recognized the necessity of en-
couraging economic advancement in 
the Caribbean Basin, encompassing 
not only the Caribbean island nations 
but also countries on the Caribbean 
littoral, including Central America. 
This was due in no small part to a 
number of political disruptions and 
the threat of the spread of commu-
nism, notable with the Nicaraguan 
Revolution in 1979, civil wars and 
unrest in El Salvador, Honduras and 
Guatemala and the expansion of the 
regional narcotics drug trade, with 
the connivance of a number of cor-
rupt governments, from the northern 
coast of South America to the United 
States.
 The administration of President 
Ronald Reagan established the Ca-
ribbean Basin Initiative as an effort 
to rejuvenate the Caribbean Basin 
economies and therefore reduce the 
incentive for radical political changes 
and criminal activity. The core aspect 
of the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
was the enactment of the Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983 
(CBERA).13 Under the CBERA the 
President was authorized to grant 
duty-free treatment to all eligible ar-
ticles originating from any beneficiary 
country in accordance with provisions 
of the Act. “Beneficiary countries” are 
listed in the Act, including each of the 
current signatories to CAFTA. The 
President could designate a coun-
try as a beneficiary to the CBERA 
if it met certain conditions, and was 
prohibited from designating a coun-
try as a beneficiary under certain 
conditions, most notably if it was a 
communist country; had national-
ized, expropriated or otherwise seized 
property owned by a U.S. citizen; or 
had repudiated or nullified existing 
contracts or violated patent or trade-
mark conventions.14 Section 2703 of 
the CBERA identifies commodities 
produced in the beneficiary countries 
which would be eligible for duty free 
treatment. 
 In 1990 the United States enacted 
the Caribbean Basin Economic Re-
covery Expansion Act of 1990 (Ex-
pansion Act)15 with the goal to both 
reaffirm the CBERA and to amend it 
to improve its operation. The Expan-
sion Act addresses certain types of 
products in greater detail, increases 
duty-free allotments, more fully ad-
dresses rules of origin for the compo-
nents of products and even contains 
amendments to the section dealing 
with worker rights. 
 In 1994 the elected leaders of 
thirty-four countries in North and 
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after a contentious debate in Con-
gress and nationally, the U.S. Sen-
ate passed implementing legislation 
on June 30, 2005 with the House of 
Representatives following with a very 
close vote on July 28, 2005. President 
Bush signed the legislation into law 
on August 2, 2005.5 
 In Central America, several party 
nations saw their national legisla-
tures ratify CAFTA by large margins, 
and relatively soon after formal sign-
ing in 2004. The Salvadoran legisla-
ture was the first to ratify CAFTA 
on December 17, 2004, followed by 
the Honduran legislative ratification 
on March 3, 2005 and Guatemalan 
ratification on March 10, 2005. The 
Dominican Republic ratified CAFTA 
on September 6, 2005 with an almost 
unanimous vote in the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate.6 
 Ratification has been most dif-
ficult in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. 
The Nicaraguan ratification process 
involved strident opposition in some 
quarters, and CAFTA was finally 
ratified by a narrower margin on 
October 9, 2005.7 The ratification pro-
cess in Costa Rica has been held up 
based upon objections by unions and 
others to several aspects of CAFTA, 
including in particular opening up of 
trade in insurance and telecommu-
nications services and the possibil-
ity of privatization of certain State 
industries.8 President Oscar Arias, 
who favors CAFTA, won election in 
2006 by a narrow margin on his sup-
port for the agreement and in July 
2007 he prevailed in the Costa Rican 
court system in his effort to hold a 
national referendum on CAFTA. That 
referendum is scheduled to be held on 
October 7.9
 CAFTA contains a provision, at 
Chapter 22, Article 22.5, that the 
Agreement shall enter into force on 
January 1, 2005 provided that the 
United States and one or more other 
signatories notify the depository that 
they have completed their applicable 
legal procedures, but if the Agreement 
did not enter into force on January 1, 
2005, the Agreement shall enter into 
force after the United States and one 
or more other signatories make such 
a notification, on such later date as 
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South America met at the Summit of 
the Americas. They agreed to work 
towards the negotiation and con-
clusion of a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas by the year 2005. In work-
ing towards that goal, a number of 
countries entered into negotiations 
with the United States to establish 
localized free trade agreements, the 
ultimate goal to combine them into 
a free trade area encompassing the 
entire Western Hemisphere. 
 On January 1, 1994, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) entered into force between 
the United States, Canada and Mexi-
co.16 One of the effects of NAFTA was 
that it eliminated the advantages 
enjoyed by the beneficiary countries 
of the CBERA and related provisions 
of the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
against Mexico in relative trade with 
the United States. At the same time, 
NAFTA became a model for the ex-
pansion of free trade regimes in Latin 
America.
 Political stability seemed to re-
turn to Central America with the 
conclusion of civil wars and success 
of democratic elections in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador and efforts to control 
the narcotics trade in the Caribbean. 
At the same time, natural disasters 
in the form of several catastrophic 
hurricanes struck the Caribbean and 
Central America in the late 1990s, 
leading to severe economic disrup-
tion.17 As a result of these trends 
through the 1990s, in 2000 the United 
States enacted the United States 
– Caribbean Basin Trade Partner-
ship Act (CBTPA)18 as part of the 
Trade and Development Act of 2000.19 
The main purpose of this Act was to 
provide the twenty-four beneficiary 
countries of the Caribbean Basin Ini-
tiative enhanced trade preferences to 
equalize their U.S. trading privileges 
with those of Mexico under NAFTA 
and to encourage negotiations to-
wards the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas. A key effect of the CBTPA 
was to significantly expand prefer-
ential treatment for apparel made 
in the Caribbean Basin region. The 
CBTPA would also give NAFTA-like 
parity on a temporary basis, pend-
ing expansion of the FTAA negotia-
tions.20 The enactment of CAFTA now 
supersedes these various Caribbean 
Basin treaties with respect to the 
beneficiary countries.
 Shortly after the CBTPA was en-
acted negotiations began in 2003 for 
CAFTA. At the same time, the Unit-
ed States and Chile entered into a 
free trade agreement21 and by early 
2007 the United States was negoti-
ating or had signed bilateral trade 
agreements with Panama, Colombia, 
Peru and Bolivia.22 Prospects for the 
Colombian agreement appear dim-
mest due to opposition in the Demo-
cratic-controlled Senate based upon 
issues with Colombia’s anti-guerilla 
campaign and alleged human rights 
abuses, and other political issues may 
yet derail negotiations with Bolivia 
and Peru. While the nations of the 
Americas were unable to reach their 
goal of creating a Free Trade Area 
of the Americas by 2005, the extent 
of smaller regional free trade agree-
ments, and the potential merger of 
these agreements (as was done with 
the Central America and Dominican 
Republic negotiations) gives promise 
that the free trade concept can be ex-
panded through much of the region. 
IV. The CAFTA as an 
Engine to Promote the Rule 
of Law
 In many respects CAFTA serves 
as a vehicle for promoting honest 
and stable government. An increase 
in legitimate trade, critical for eco-
nomic development and growth in 
all of the party states, can only be ac-
complished where the legal environ-
ment gives reassurance of security 
and protection to those involved in 
trade and investment. There are five 
areas addressed by CAFTA which are 
critical to the promotion of a stable 
economic environment grounded in 
the Rule of Law.
A. Transparency and Anti-
Corruption
 The Preamble to CAFTA sets forth 
that the member states “seek to facili-
tate regional trade by promoting ef-
ficient and transparent customs pro-
cedures that reduce costs and ensure 
predictability for their importers and 
exporters.” The parties also resolve to 
“promote transparency and eliminate 
bribery and corruption in interna-
tional trade and investment.”
 Chapter V provides technical and 
practical applications for this goal. 
Article 5.2 mandates simplified proce-
dures to timely release goods, thereby 
reducing the opportunity for extortion 
and corruption in the import process. 
Article 5.5 requires the parties to co-
operate in achieving compliance with 
their respective laws, and in particu-
lar requires parties with reasonable 
suspicion of unlawful activity related 
to the laws and regulations governing 
imports to coordinate with other par-
ties and share information in efforts 
to combat unlawful activity. Article 
5.10 requires that a state party, upon 
written request of an importer, must 
provide an advanced written ruling 
on the application of tariffs prior to 
the importation into its territory of 
goods from another party. This provi-
sion may have the effect of reducing 
the opportunity for corrupt customs 
officials to extort money from import-
ers by holding arrived goods under 
false pretenses.
 Chapter VII, pertaining to the 
elimination of technical barriers to 
trade, may likewise serve indirectly 
to reduce the opportunities for local-
ized corruption by requiring parties 
to adhere to international standards 
and guidelines that reduce the oppor-
tunities for local officials to set their 
own rules for improper purposes. This 
is an ideal example of the application 
of the Rule of Law, setting uniform 
and widely recognized norms and 
standards to eliminate opportuni-
ties for chaos or corruption. Article 
7.7 deals entirely with the issue of 
transparency. This article mandates 
that each party shall allow citizens of 
the other parties to participate in the 
development of standards, technical 
regulations and conformity assess-
ment procedures. All such standards 
are to be published and made avail-
able to the public. This requires com-
plete openness in the promulgation 
and enforcement of regulations and 
should also make these regulations 
reasonably uniform. This will give im-
porters assurance of set laws. Hope-
fully such uniform regulations will 
be approved by all party states with 
their joint participation. Article 7.8 
sets up a committee on technical bar-
riers to monitor the implementation 
and administration of this Chapter.
 Chapter IX, pertaining to govern-
ment procurement, sets out in Ar-
ticle 9.13 to “ensure integrity in pro-
curement practices.” Referencing the 
anti-corruption measures of Article 
18.8, this article requires each party 
continued, next page
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to adopt or maintain procedures to 
declare ineligible suppliers that the 
party has determined have engaged in 
fraudulent or other illegal actions in 
relation to government procurement.
 Chapter XVIII is solely devoted to 
the issues of transparency and cor-
ruption. Section A addresses trans-
parency. In addition to requiring open 
communication between the parties 
and publication of each party’s laws, 
regulations, procedures and admin-
istrative rulings, Article 18.4 estab-
lishes administrative proceedings 
for persons of another party directly 
affected by a party’s administrative 
decisions. Section B pertains solely to 
anti-corruption. Article 18.8 requires 
each party to adopt or maintain neces-
sary legislative or other measures to 
establish as criminal offenses certain 
matters affecting international trade 
or investment, including bribery of 
public officials, acceptance by public 
officials of bribes or favors, directly 
or indirectly, or aiding and abetting 
such practices.
B. Investment and Property 
Guarantees
 The Preamble sets forth that the 
parties seek to “create and expand a 
secure market for the goods and ser-
vices produced in their territories . ..” 
and to “ensure a predictable commer-
cial framework for business planning 
and investment.” One of the principal 
objectives set forth in Chapter I is 
to provide adequate and effective 
protection and enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights in each party’s 
territory. The key chapter for this con-
cept, however, is Chapter X - Invest-
ment. In addition to guaranteeing 
equal treatment for investors of other 
party states, Article 10.7 contains a 
clear limitation on any governmental 
expropriation or nationalization of a 
covered investment, either directly or 
indirectly. This article sets a general 
prohibition, with exceptions made for 
public purpose, in a non-discrimina-
tory manner, and only upon prompt 
payment of “adequate and effective 
compensation” in accordance with 
provisions contained in the article. 
The article also specifies that such 
compensation must be equivalent to 
the fair market value of the expropri-
ated investment, be paid without de-
lay and be fully realizable and freely 
transferable. Finally, Article 10.10 
addresses a problem that has arisen 
as disguised nationalization in the 
past. This article mandates that no 
party may require an enterprise to 
appoint to senior management posi-
tions natural persons of any particu-
lar nationality. This prevents a state 
from gaining control over a foreign 
investment by requiring the company 
to cede control of the management of 
the investment to local persons with 
connections to corrupt local officials.
 Chapter XI likewise contains, at Ar-
ticle 11.9, another protection against 
indirect nationalization by requiring 
free transfer of payments out of the 
territory of a party to prevent control 
over the finances of an investment 
and other currency restrictions that 
inhibit free investment.
C. Coordination and Uniformity 
in Domestic Laws and Equal 
Treatment Under Same
 A third pillar for the establish-
ment of the Rule of Law are terms in 
CAFTA to promulgate uniformity in 
domestic laws of each party affecting 
trade and to encourage coordination 
between the parties to create uni-
formity in their domestic laws and 
equal treatment of their traders and 
investors. 
 In the Preamble the parties resolve 
to “ensure a predictable commercial 
framework for business planning and 
investment,” particularly recognizing 
“the interest of the Central American 
parties in strengthening and deepen-
ing their regional economic integra-
tion.” Economic integration can only 
be accomplished where there is uni-
formity of the legal regime governing 
trade and commerce so as to allow the 
free flow of goods and services.
 The Preamble also states that the 
parties are committed to building on 
their respective rights and obliga-
tions under the Marrakesh Agree-
ment established in the World Trade 
Organization and other multi-lateral 
and bi-lateral instruments of cooper-
ation. Under Chapter III, Article 3.2 
commits each party to accord nation-
al treatment to the goods of another 
party in accordance with Article III 
of the GATT 1994, and incorporates 
Article III of the GATT 1994 into 
CAFTA. The potential for discrimi-
natory treatment in enforcement of 
tariffs in each party is precluded by 
Article 3.3 which eliminates, either 
gradually or immediately, most na-
tional tariffs. Article 3.5(a) permits 
free transit through the territory 
of the party states of vehicles and 
containers carrying products in inter-
national trade, and Article 3.11 pro-
hibits the imposition of export taxes 
on any goods. These articles under 
Chapter III eliminate most domestic 
tariff regimes and thereby create a 
uniform open trading system, with 
the same system applicable in each 
party.
 Chapter IV approaches the con-
cept of uniformity and equalization 
in a different light by mandating, 
at Article 4.21, common guidelines 
for the interpretation, application 
and administration of provisions un-
der Chapters III and IV, particularly 
as they apply to rules of origin for 
products to be provided with free or 
favorable tariff treatment. Where 
regulations and tariffs are not abso-
lutely eliminated, they are subject to 
mandates to create uniform common 
regulations and guidelines for all par-
ties to the Convention.
 Similarly, under Chapter V deal-
ing with customs administration and 
trade facilitation, Article 5.5 again 
mandates cooperation between the 
parties. While under this article the 
parties are not required to create uni-
form customs and trade regulations, 
they are required to give advance no-
tice to other parties of any significant 
modifications in their administrative 
policies or similar developments re-
lated to their laws and regulations 
governing importations where those 
are likely to substantially affect the 
operation of the Convention. They are 
often required to cooperate in achiev-
ing compliance with their respec-
tive national laws and regulations. 
Due to the detailed requirements of 
the latter clause, it will be necessary 
for the parties to closely coordinate 
and unify, as much as possible, their 
respective domestic regulations in 
order to adequately enforce those 
of the other parties for the efficient 
continuation of trade.
 There are a number of articles in 
various chapters of CAFTA mandat-
ing equal treatment by each party 
of the citizens of other parties in all 
aspects of trade and investment. For 




Article 10.3 requires each party to 
accord to investors of another party 
treatment no less favorable than that 
it accords to its own investors. In 
Chapter XI concerning trade and 
services, Article 11.9 requires the 
parties to provide mutual recogni-
tion of all licenses and certifications, 
including recognition of the education 
or experience obtained by citizens 
of another party on the same basis 
as that recognized for the residents 
of that party. In Chapter XII relat-
ing to financial services, Article 12.2 
again mandates that each party shall 
accord to investors of another party 
treatment no less favorable than that 
accorded to domestic investors in the 
establishment of various types of 
financial services.
D. Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms
 One of the most important aspects 
of establishing the Rule of Law for the 
governance of any state or grouping 
of states is the creation of adequate 
and impartial dispute resolution 
mechanisms. CAFTA contains ex-
tensive provisions for the inter-party 
and private (individual) resolution of 
disputes arising out of the free trade 
regime that has been created.
 Under Chapter I, Article 1.2(f) pro-
vides as a basic objective that the par-
ties are to “create effective procedures 
for the implementation and applica-
tion of this agreement, for its joint 
administration, and for the resolu-
tion of disputes.” Thereafter, Chapter 
XX in its entirety governs “dispute 
settlement.” Section A, Articles 20.1 
through 20.19 contains extremely 
detailed provisions and procedures 
to follow for any disputes regarding 
the interpretation or application of 
CAFTA, where a party state considers 
that an actual or proposed measure 
of another party state is inconsistent 
with CAFTA, where a party state 
has failed to carry out its obligations 
under CAFTA, or where the action of 
another party state would cause nul-
lification or impairment of CAFTA. 
Section A of Chapter XX requires 
consultation and mediation. Failing 
this, there are detailed rules for the 
implementation of an arbitration pro-
cedure and limited exceptions to the 
requirement for arbitration.
 Section B of Chapter XX pertains 
to domestic proceedings and private 
commercial dispute settlement. Ar-
ticles 20.20 through 20.22 provide 
for referral of matters to judicial or 
administrative proceedings and al-
ternative dispute resolution.
 Other chapters of CAFTA set 
out dispute resolution mechanisms 
pertaining to specific aspects of the 
Convention. Chapter V (Customs Ad-
ministration and Trade Facilitation) 
provides for administrative and judi-
cial review under Article 5.8. Chapter 
X (Investment), at Section B, contains 
the most detailed and specialized 
investor-state dispute settlement 
system. This provides detailed rules 
mandating submission of a claim to 
arbitration with certain conditions 
and limitations. Importantly, Article 
10.21 contains a detailed transpar-
ency requirement for the arbitral 
proceedings.
 Under Chapter XII governing fi-
nancial services Articles 12.18 and 
12.19 provide another dispute settle-
ment mechanism governing this as-
pect of the new trade regime. 
 With the extensive dispute reso-
lution mechanisms set up to govern 
interpretation of CAFTA as a whole 
and to govern private disputes aris-
ing under the CAFTA regime, as well 
as incorporation of other interna-
tional trade agreements, the state 
parties and their citizens should find 
adequate tools to enforce the terms 
and conditions of the new regime. 
This is perhaps the most important 
aspect of CAFTA in promoting the 
establishment of the Rule of Law over 
this free trade area.
E. Labor and Environment
 Two issues that garnered the larg-
est amount of protest outside of busi-
ness and government circles during 
the course of the CAFTA negotiations 
were labor and environment. These 
grabbed the attention of populist 
protesters and also appear to be the 
subject of much of the anti-CAFTA 
writings, both in the popular press 
and in academic circles.23
 While CAFTA is attacked for not 
adequately protecting the interests 
of labor or satisfactorily addressing 
environmental concerns, it should be 
noted that nothing in CAFTA reduces 
protections in these categories, and 
in fact the CAFTA regime as a whole 
would tend to encourage promotion 
of protective measures. Admittedly, 
the general purpose of a free trade 
agreement such as CAFTA is not 
directed to such protections, but with 
proper mandates and oversight of 
party states these goals can be ad-
dressed.
 The Preamble specifies that the 
parties are resolved to “protect, en-
hance, and enforce basic workers’ 
rights and strengthen their coop-
eration on labor matters…create 
new employment opportunities and 
improve working conditions and liv-
ing standards in their respective 
territories,” and therefore the state 
parties will “build on their respec-
tive international commitments on 
labor matters.” Also, the parties re-
solve to “implement this agreement 
in a manner consistent with environ-
mental protection and conservation, 
promote sustainable development, 
and strengthen their cooperation on 
environmental matters,” and “pro-
tect and preserve the environment 
and enhance the means for doing so, 
including through the conservation 
of natural resources in their respec-
tive territories.” Other sections of 
the Preamble resolve to “create new 
opportunities for economic and social 
development in the region” and to 
“safeguard the public welfare.” 
 While these protective goals are 
the most extensively addressed terms 
in the Preamble to CAFTA, CAFTA 
also contains a full chapter devoted 
to labor protection, and another full 
chapter devoted to the environment. 
Chapter XVI – Labor first requires, 
at Article 16.2, that parties must en-
force their existing labor laws. This 
goes beyond what some writers have 
deemed to be the inadequate labor 
protections existing in the laws of 
many of the Central American coun-
tries. Article 16.1 reaffirms the obli-
gations of all members of CAFTA as 
members of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and their commit-
ments under the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work and its follow-up (ILO Dec-
laration).24 
 Prior to the conclusion of the 
CAFTA negotiations, surveys were 
performed within the various party 
states and it was determined general-
ly that the party states have sufficient 
labor laws on the books, although in 
some cases there are problems with 
enforcement or the ability to enforce 
those laws.25 For this, Articles 16.5 
continued, next page
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and 16.6 and Annex 16.5 provide for 
cooperation among the parties and a 
capacity-building mechanism where-
by assistance can be obtained to help 
with full enforcement of existing la-
bor laws and to bring any deficiencies 
up to standard. With the assistance 
not only of the United States but of 
the more prosperous Central Ameri-
can parties, those states which are 
deemed to be unable to fully enforce 
their existing labor laws or to imple-
ment enforcement systems accept-
able to the ILO will now have the 
opportunity to share in both technical 
resources and obtain financial and 
informational assistance.
 Chapter XVII – Environment is 
structured in a similar manner to the 
labor chapter. It also sets goals and 
mandates enforcement of existing 
laws, and furthermore provides for 
shared information and assistance 
in developing adequate enforcement 
mechanisms and collaborative assis-
tance. The chapter references other 
multi-lateral environmental agree-
ments to which the state parties are 
members and requires continued 
efforts to enhance the mutual sup-
port of multi-lateral environmental 
agreements within their jurisdiction. 
While certain aspects of this chapter 
are generalized or set in aspirational 
terms, such as Annex 17.9 pertain-
ing to environmental cooperation, 
this will allow the parties with more 
advanced environmental laws and 
technical enforcement to readily as-
sist others to improve their envi-
ronmental regulations. The strong 
interest shown by many non-gov-
ernmental groups during the course 
of the CAFTA negotiations would 
also indicate that pressure from 
these groups after the enactment of 
CAFTA will encourage the parties to 
continue to develop environmental 
enforcement more thoroughly than 
before they became parties to CAFTA. 
Again, CAFTA has served to spread 
the interest in regulation of labor and 
environmental matters more directly 
to countries which would not have 
benefited from these concepts with-
out joining CAFTA.
Conclusion
 The approved text of CAFTA, in-
cluding its Annexes, and the goals set 
for implementation by the countries 
which have ratified the Convention 
provides a great opportunity to es-
tablish a relatively uniform legal 
system governing commerce in Cen-
tral America. This uniform system 
will produce certainty to businesses 
and investors in the region, promot-
ing the growth of commerce and free 
enterprise. The unification of most 
aspects of the legal system governing 
trade will also help, both directly and 
indirectly, to reduce abuses caused by 
the uncertain enforcement of vary-
ing laws and ad hoc enforcement of 
regulations. In the global economy, 
only this certainty will encourage the 
development of trade.
 There is legitimacy in the concerns 
expressed by some about the effects of 
opening smaller and less developed 
economies to competition from large 
industries and agriculture based in an 
economic superpower.26 CAFTA takes 
account of this in multiple special pro-
visions and exceptions contained in 
Annexes and reservations as to each 
member country. The concerns are 
also noted in the set of goals enumer-
ated in the first chapter of the Conven-
tion. There is no question that some 
amount of dislocation and economic 
stress may result from the initial 
implementation of the open market. 
However, the benefits foreseen from 
the application of a uniform and open 
legal system for the benefit of trade 
may extend much further than even 
the supporters of CAFTA can now 
anticipate. The free trade systems 
which have benefited other nations 
and regions, if handled properly and 
monitored closely, may bring tremen-
dous benefits to Central America and 
the Caribbean first dreamed of by 
statesmen in these countries some 
two hundred years ago. 
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taxes, undergo rigorous security and 
background checks, and pay hefty 
fines for entering the country ille-
gally. This earned legalization is not 
an “amnesty” program when the gov-
ernment penalizes immigrants with 
hefty fines for their illegal entry.
Tougher and More 
Effective Enforcement
 Failure to pass the comprehensive 
immigration reform bill means that 
enforcement measures will not be 
adequately funded until after the 
presidential elections. In the mean-
time, the country continues to fear 
terrorism and to desire a reduction in 
illegal immigration. However, the so-
lution to the illegal immigration prob-
lem is not to build a wall along the 
southern border with Mexico. Illegal 
immigration may be curtailed along 
the northern and southern borders 
by increasing the number of border 
patrol and electronic surveillance. 
Congress must appropriate the funds 
to fully staff Border Patrol and border 
security technology. Already Con-
gress has committed to a variety of 
technology-based security measures 
such as lighting, sensors, and night 
vision devices that would enhance the 
capability of Border Patrol officers to 
detect, locate and apprehend illegal 
entrants.
Conclusion
 Perhaps the United States is far 
less divided on immigration than the 
current debate suggests. According to 
another recent Gallup Poll, generally 
U.S. citizens have a positive view of 
immigration in the abstract. “Three 
in four have consistently said it has 
been good for the United States in the 
past, and a majority says it is good for 
the nation today.”5 A comprehensive 
immigration reform bill would chan-
nel this general sentiment into a bill 
that increases employment-based 
visas, creates tougher and more effec-
tive enforcement, and provides a road 
to legalization for undocumented im-
migrants already in the country. In 
order to successfully overhaul our 
current immigration systems, these 
three elements must be addressed 
and implemented simultaneously. 
The goal should be to replace the cur-
rent illegal flow of immigration with a 
lawful influx since it is arguably good 
for the economy and necessary for our 
national security.
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